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proach and aims to provide useful inputs for decisionmaking.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not neces-
sarily reflect those of PIDS or any of the study's sponsor(s).
  he  Estrada  administration prides itself as being
  a “pro-poor” administration. It cannot be denied,
  however, that past administrations were also con-
cerned with the plight of the poor people in this country. In
fact, they administered several programs for the poor that
are still running today, albeit that some have assumed dif-
ferent names. Nonetheless, despite the abundance of pov-
erty buster programs and the resources mobilized by the
government to support such programs in the past fifty years,
poverty still remains widespread. In 1997, for instance, pov-
erty incidence stood at 32.1 percent, and given the adverse
impact of the ongoing economic crisis, it is very likely that
such number could have gone up by this time.
It is, therefore, imperative for the Estrada administra-
tion to thoroughly re-assess these poverty alleviation pro-
grams to improve their performance. This is where the
Estrada administration can make a big difference and dis-
tinguish itself as a truly “pro-poor” administration.
Credit as poverty-buster instrument
It has been argued and empirically shown that the
poor do not generally have access to bank loans. Because
of this and the scarcity of jobs, they have very little chance
of freeing themselves from the poverty trap. Loans from
informal lenders—to which they can easily access—only
make their situation worse in view of the exorbitant interest
rates they have to pay.
Because of this, past—and present—administrations
used credit as one of the instruments in their poverty alle-
viation programs. Even nonfinancial government agencies
like the Department of Agriculture (DA) and Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) took part in such credit-focused
anti-poverty programs through the credit programs they set
up which were directed specifically to the sectors they are
supposed to serve. Thus, before long, there was a boom in
the number of government-managed credit programs directed
for the poor, reaching a total of 86 in June 1997, according
to a survey conducted by the Credit Policy Improvement Pro-
gram (CPIP). Interestingly, many of these directed credit pro-
grams (DCPs) had overlapping clientele. Yet, the clamor from
the poor for access to credit continued, suggesting that some-
thing must have gone wrong with these DCPs.
In this regard, there is a need to review these DCPs.
Two studies conducted by Lamberte, Casuga and Erfe (1997
and 1998) did just that. The first one examined the perfor-
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mance of DCPs managed by government nonfinancial agen-
cies and the second looked into those that are implemented
by government financial institutions, government-owned and
controlled corporations and government nonbank financial
institutions. This Policy Notes issue contains the major re-
sults and policy recommendations of these studies.
What are DCPs?
As defined by the National Credit Council (NCC), DCPs
are credit programs that cater to specific sectors such as
small and medium enterprises, inventors, farmers, and oth-
ers. The funds of these DCPs may come from budgetary
allocations or official development assistance from bilat-
eral or multilateral donor organizations in the form of grants
or loans.
The institutions involved in managing or implementing
the DCPs include
] government financial institutions (GFIs) such as
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP),
] government-owned and controlled corporations
(GOCCs) and nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) such as
the Quedan and Rural Credit Guarantee Corp. (QUEDANCOR),
People's Credit and Finance Corp. (PCFC), and Technology
and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC), and
] government nonfinancial agencies (GNFAs) such
as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and Depart-
ment of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
To reach their target clientele, the DCPs utilize two
modes of credit delivery, namely, direct mode wherein the
program originator of the DCP assumes all tasks related to
lending, including policy setting, credit extension, monitor-
ing and loan collection, and indirect mode wherein the pro-
gram originator taps intermediaries such as cooperatives,
nongovernment organizations and people’s organizations
to act as either fund administrators or conduits.
Performance indicators
In assessing DCPs, one must measure their effective-
ness and efficiency. An effective DCP is one that reaches a
large number of its target borrowers given its limited re-
sources. An efficient DCP, on the other hand, is one that is
able to recover loans, along with interest charges and fees,
so that its funds can continue to grow in real terms and
accommodate an increasing number of borrowers in subse-
quent periods.
In their assessment of the DCPs, the two studies con-
structed an outreach index and an efficiency index. Out-
reach is measured as a weighted average of two indices,
namely, the ratio of average loan size in the sector being
targeted to the average loan size of the DCP being exam-
ined, and the ratio of actual number of borrowers served by
the DCP to the potential number of borrowers it can reach
given its limited resources. Efficiency is gauged in terms of
operational efficiency and cost recovery. The efficiency in-
dex takes into consideration cost related to the implemen-
tation of the DCP, including administrative and risk-induced
costs, and cost of borrowed funds and equity capital.
Evaluation results: How did the DCPs perform?
Based on these indices, the two studies yielded the
following results.
DCPs of GNFAs DCPs of GNFAs
The first study covered 37 DCPs being implemented
by 13 GNFAs. Out of this 37, only 30 have complete data
and only 4 are purely credit programs. Majority are lending
programs that have other components, including technical
assistance in the form of institution-building and provision
of support services. Seventeen of the DCPs cater to the
agriculture and rural sector, eight target the poor communi-
ties and the disadvantaged groups while the rest cover the
small and medium enterprises, the labor sector, inventors,
cooperatives and people’s organizations.
Majority of the DCPs are funded locally, either through
budgetary appropriations or special funds created by law,
while only 6 utilize loans and grants from foreign sources.
By geographical scope, 26 DCPs are implemented nation-
wide, 8 in selected provinces identified as poor provinces
under the Social Reform Agenda and key production areas
of the Department of Agriculture, and 3 are area-based.
Figure 1 shows the loci of these GNFA-managed DCPs
in a quadrant measuring their effectiveness and efficiency.
Ideally, these DCPs should be found in the fourth cell where
they are both effective and efficient. However, the results
of the study show that none of these DCPs is in this cell.
Out of the 30 DCPs evaluated (only those with complete
data), 10 were found to be inefficient and have low out-
reach indices. The remaining 20 had high outreach indices
but were inefficient.
The finding on the efficiency level of these 30 DCPs
needs further amplification. Actually, 10 out of these 303
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were found to be operationally efficient. This means that
they were able to recover the administrative and risk-induced
costs of the loans granted to their beneficiaries. However,
in terms of recovering the cost of funds, these DCPs were
not successful. As such, these 10 DCPs—identified in Fig-
ure 1 by an asterisk—still failed to satisfy the test of the
efficiency index.
As far as the mode of credit delivery is concerned,
meanwhile, the use of intermediaries does not seem to make
any difference on the effectiveness of the GNFA-managed
DCPs.  For instance, of the 10 DCPs with low outreach indi-
ces shown in Figure 1, six used the indirect mode of credit
delivery. At the same time, majority of the other 20 DCPs
found to have a high outreach level reached their ultimate
clientele quite effectively through the use of these mass-
based intermediaries like cooperatives and people’s orga-
nizations. Perhaps, the fact that these intermediaries be-
Figure 1. Outreach and Efficiency of DCPs
Implemented by GNFAs











Note: 1 - using direct mode of credit delivery
2 - using indirect mode of credit delivery

































longed to the target sector and were the beneficiaries of the
funds themselves somewhat helped.
The preceding findings indicate that GNFAs focused
more on outreach rather than on efficiency in implementing
the DCPs. To become sustainable, however, they must also
become more efficient. To be so, they must either double
the interest rate they charge on their loans to fully recover
their costs of lending or drastically reduce their operational
costs. Or both. Otherwise, the only way to keep them going
is for the government to continue pouring more money into
them.
DCPs of GFIs and GOCCs/NBFIs DCPs of GFIs and GOCCs/NBFIs
The second study covered 2 GFIs, namely, the LBP
and DBP, and 5 GOCCs/NBFIs, namely, the National Liveli-
hood Support Fund (NLSF), PCFC, Quedancor, Small Busi-
ness Guarantee and Finance Corporation (SBGFC) and TLRC.
There are 45 DCPs being implemented by these agencies.
However, only 32 of this number which have complete data
are included in the study. Fourteen of the 32 cater to small
borrowers who belong to the so-called “basic sectors” while
the rest (18) provide credit to specific sectors regardless of
the size of the borrowers (i.e., small, medium and large or
SML borrowers). Of the 21 DCPs managed by the GFIs, 2
cater to the agriculture sector, 4 to the small livelihood sec-
tor, 3 to special sectors including environment, forestry and
LGUs, and 12 to the SML enterprises. On the other hand, 4
out of the 11 DCPs implemented by the GOCCs/NBFIs are
earmarked for the poor, 2 for agriculture, 2 for the small
livelihood sector and 3 for the SML enterprises.
Funding sources of the abovementioned DCPs vary.
For the GFIs, 17 out of the 21 programs they run are funded
by loans and grants from foreign sources while the four are
funded by special funds, including the Countryside Develop-
ment Fund (CDF). On the other hand, majority of the GOCCs/
NBFIs’ programs (9 out of 11) are funded by internally-gen-













Figure 2 shows the outreach and efficiency perfor-
mances of the 14 DCPs catering to small borrowers or the
"basic sectors." Only 2 were found to be efficient and effec-
tive. Both are being managed by a GFI and use the indirect
mode of lending. Four were found to be efficient but have
low levels of outreach. On the other hand, 2 programs have
high outreach but are, on the whole, inefficient despite be-
ing operationally efficient. One of these belongs to a GFI.4
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Finally, 6 DCPs have low levels of outreach and are ineffi-
cient.
In sum, the results of the second study generally indi-
cate, albeit not strongly, that GFIs can manage DCPs for
small borrowers more efficiently and effectively than other
government agencies. Still, they have to exert some more
effort and choose the appropriate mode of credit delivery
for DCPs to improve further. In terms of delivery mode, the
study notes that the indirect mode is a better approach.
Time to rationalize the DCPs
A credit program, if properly managed, can be an ef-
fective instrument for uplifting the living standard of the poor.
The results of the two studies, however, show that the DCPs
for the poor in this country have not generally performed
well. For many nonfinancial government agencies which
decided to be involved in credit programs, in fact, the ex-
pected result did not materialize despite their seeming natu-
ral advantage over banks due to their close working rela-
tions with their intended clientele.
The Estrada administration, therefore, has to take bold
steps to reform the credit programs for the poor. As sug-
gested by the results of the second study and elsewhere,
the relatively more successful providers of financial services
to the poor on a sustainable basis are banks. The advan-
Figure 2. Outreach and Efficiency of DCPs
for Small Borrowers Implemented by GFIs
and GOCCs/NBFIs
Low Outreach High Outreach
LBP - 5-25-701
LBP - SLFAP1
NLSF - LCAP for ARCs2
QUEDANCOR - FARE1
TLRC -  SDML1
PCFC - ADB-IFAD RMFP2
*  - operationally efficient
1 - using direct mode of credit delivery
































tages of banks are that they can provide a much wider array
of financial services like deposits and project analysis to
their clients other than credit, build a bank-client relation-
ship, and operate in a manner transparent to the regulators
and the public.
In the Philippines, many nonbank government agen-
cies have tried to “quack like a duck,” but failed miserably.
Thus, if we really want to hear a genuine “quack,” we should
get a real duck to do it.
Must do
What must then be done to reform the DCPs?
] The government must transfer all directed credit
programs to regular government banks and rationalize them.
It must see to it that government banks remain focused on
their primary mandates.
] For credit programs covered under certain agree-
ments with donor agencies, the government must renegoti-
ate these agreements so that they can be transferred to the
government-owned banks.
] The government should no longer fund credit pro-
grams of nonbank government agencies. In this regard, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) should care-
fully scrutinize budget proposals of nonfinancial government
agencies and secure certification from the heads of these
agencies that none of the funds will be used for credit pro-
grams.  4
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